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Abstract
As Brunnermeier and Parker (2003), we examine a static one-riskfree-one-
risky asset portfolio choice when the investor’s well-being is affected by the
anticipatory feelings associated to potential capital gains and losses. These
feelings can be manipulated by the choice of subjective beliefs on the distri-
bution of returns. However, the bias of these endogeneous subjective beliefs
induces the choice of a portfolio that is suboptimal with respect to the objec-
tive expected utility of final wealth. We characterize the structure of these
optimal beliefs. We first show that optimal subjective beliefs must be degen-
erate with only two possible returns. Moreover, under some weak conditions
on the utility function, these two atoms are at the lower and upper bounds
of the objectively feasible returns, as suggested in the cumulative prospect
theory. When the intensity of anticipatory feelings is small, the formation of
beliefs must be biased in favor of optimism, which implies an increase in the
equilibrium demand for the risky asset. We also show that the optimal beliefs
are approximately independent of the investor’s degree of risk aversion.
Keywords: anticipatory feelings, portfolio choice, overconfidence, posi-
tive thinking, endogeneous beliefs, cumulative prospect theory.
1 Introduction
In the late XIXth century Emile Coue´, a french psychologist at the University
of Nancy, promoted the idea that learning to control our thoughts can do
much to improve well-being. Positive thinking improves the quality of life
of patients with a life-threatening disease by inducing them to reduce their
subjective probability of dying. The so-called ”method Coue´” has however
an important undesirable effect. By artificially downgrading the risk, the
patient may spend less effort to fight the illness. Psychotherapists are well
aware of the problem, as most of them forcefully claim that the method does
never replace the medical treatment.
Learning to play with our beliefs is important but dangerous for our well-
being. In his famous book entitled ”The Gambler”, Dostoevsky describes a
young middle-class man who dreams that he will become wealthy by gambling
one day at the casino. However, he perfectly knows that the odds at the
casino are unfair, as he forcefully advises other people not to gamble. This
illustrates what Sigmund Freud will describe sixty years later as illusions, i.e.,
beliefs that establish themselves by the will of our desires. The gambler’s
optimism allows him to survive in a world of pretentious wealthy Russian
expatriates. As stated by Glaeser (2004), ”consumers will be more likely to
accept false beliefs when those beliefs make them happier”. However, relying
on his subjective beliefs that he knows to be optimistic compared to the
objective chances, the gambler eventually decides to take a chance, and loses
everything.
In this paper, we want to apply these ideas to other choice problems un-
der uncertainty. In particular, we examine the portfolio choice problem of
risk-averse consumers.1 In order to fit with the ideas developed by Dosto-
evsky, Coue´ and Freud, among others, we use a model introduced recently
by Brunnermeier and Parker (2003). Following their approach, we recognize
that current felicity is affected by the anticipation of future pleasures and dis-
pleasures. As a consequence, controlling our thoughts about the likelihood
1Alternative interpretations of our choice problem can be found in insurance economics
and in the theory of investment. A consumer faces a risk of loss for which there exists
an insurance market offering proportional insurance contracts with an actuarially unfair
tariff. The problem of the consumer is to select the rate of insurance coverage for the
risk. In the theory of investment, a risk-averse entrepreneur with a linear technology must
determine the optimal capacity of production under uncertainty about the output price.
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of these events has a direct effect on welfare. In a portfolio context, positive
thinking implies a mental manipulation of the objective probability distri-
bution of assets’ returns. If the investor has a positive demand for stocks,
method Coue´ means increasing the subjective probability of a positive excess
return. The undesirable effect of positive thinking is that this manipulation
of beliefs is likely to affect the asset allocation of the investor. This in turn
affects negatively the investor’s future felicity. We assume, as in Brunner-
meier and Parker (2003), that the investor selects subjective beliefs in order
to maximize his lifetime well-being which is an increasing function of both
current and future felicities. Because positive thinking raises current felicity
but reduces future felicity, the problem of method Coue´ is to determine the
best compromise between these two opposite forces.
This work departs from the long tradition in economics to measure an
individual’s lifetime utility as a discounted sum of the flow of felicity gener-
ated by direct consumption, as described for example by Samuelson (1937).
This tradition is incompatible with the idea that happiness is extracted not
only from the immediate consumption of goods and services, but also from
thoughts. This is particularly the case for thoughts related to savoring the
possibility of future pleasant events, or to fearing the consequences of adverse
ones. Anticipatory feelings have been incorporated in preferences by Caplin
and Leahy (2001) who considered belief-dependent felicity functions. In the
economic literature, Akerlof and Dickens (1982) were the first to assume that
subjective beliefs are derived from a welfare-maximizing process.
The distortion of beliefs affects the individual decision process in a com-
plex manner. There is an important literature on the effect of a change in
the perceived distribution of risk on the optimal exposure to it. In the case
of the one-riskfree-one-risky portfolio choice problem that we examine in this
paper, Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) have shown that a mean-preserving
spread in the distribution of returns of the risky asset does not necessarily
reduce the demand for the risky asset. In the same fashion, Fishburn and
Porter (1976) have shown that a first-order stochastically favorable shift in
this distribution can reduce the demand for the risky asset by some risk-
averse investors. Gollier (1995) characterizes the stochastic dominance order
that yields a reduction of the demand for the risky asset by all risk-averse
agents. More recently, Abel (2002) considered the effect of distorted beliefs
on the equilibrium asset prices. Abel defined optimism by using very spe-
cific first-order stochastic dominant shifts in the subjective distribution of
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the risky asset’s payoffs. He showed that optimism raises the demand for this
asset by all risk-averse investors, thereby reducing the equity premium. This
observation is particularly important in our framework as we will show that
risk-averse agents optimally distort the distribution of the risky asset in an
optimistic way.
Our model is a two-date version of the dynamic model examined by Brun-
nermeier and Parker (2003), hereafter denoted BP. We assume that the con-
sumer’s lifetime utility is a weighted sum of the date-1 felicity extracted from
savoring and of the date-2 felicity of consumption. The weight measures the
intensity of anticipatory feelings, anxiety and savoring. This parameter can
take any value between 0 and 1, whereas BP only consider the special case
with equal weights. This will allow us to explore the effect of increasing an-
ticipatory feelings on optimal beliefs and on the demand for the risky asset.
Assuming without loss of generality that the objective expected excess return
of the risky asset is positive, any risk-averse investor with a zero intensity of
anticipatory feeling will have a positive demand α∗ for the risky asset. One of
the main results of BP is to show that risk-averse investors with anticipatory
feelings will always distort beliefs, and that they will do so in such a way as
to either increase their demand of the risky asset above α∗, or to go short
on the risky asset. In this paper, we provide an in-depth description of the
optimal subjective distribution of beliefs, and we show that it is not optimal
to go short on the risky asset.
We first exploit the linearity of expected utility with respect to state
probabilities to prove that the optimal subjective probability distribution
must be degenerate with at most two atoms, i.e., optimal beliefs are binary.
This result is true for any von Neumann-Morgenstern preference functional,
any intensity of anticipatory feelings, and any objective distribution of the
risky asset. In a second step, we show under weak restrictions on the utility
function that investors select the two atoms that are at the bounds of the
set of possible asset returns. In other words, optimally controlling thoughts
leads the individual to believe that only the smallest possible return and
the largest possible return can have a positive probability to occur. This
strong result is compatible with the idea introduced by Tversky and Kah-
neman (1992) that the worst and best outcomes receive particular attention
from decision makers. Cumulative prospect theory takes this into account by
assuming an inverse S-shaped transformation function of the objective cumu-
lative distribution function. This is equivalent to transferring the probability
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mass from the interior of the support of the distribution to its lower and up-
per bounds.2 We claim that the transformation of probabilities described in
cumulative prospect theory, rather than being a genetic characteristic of hu-
man beings, corresponds to a natural tendency of rational agents to optimize
their intertemporal welfare.
Given the fact that optimal beliefs are degenerate at the extreme events,
the only remaining problem is to determine the subjective probability of the
best state. When the intensity of anticipatory feelings is small, we show that
the demand for the risky asset is larger than the demand that is optimal
under the objective distribution of excess returns. Thus, we eliminate the
possibility allowed by BP that risk-averse investors go short on the risky
asset. Moreover, we show that the optimal subjective probability of the large
return and the demand for the risky asset are increasing in the intensity of
anticipatory feelings.
Things are more complex when we allow for larger intensities of antici-
patory feelings. Because the maximum is a convex operator, the maximum
subjective expected utility of the investor is a convex function of his sub-
jective probability distribution. For example, this explains why the value of
information is always positive, or why refining the information structure a`
la Blackwell (1951) makes the decision-maker better off. The convexity of
the felicity extracted from anticipatory feelings with respect to the subjective
probability distribution alerts us about an important difficulty in the selec-
tion of optimal beliefs, since the objective function does not need anymore to
be concave in the decision variables. In the extreme case where only antic-
ipatory feelings matter for lifetime well-being, optimal beliefs degenerate to
subjective certainty at either the worse or the best possible return, yielding
an infinite demand for the risky asset and unbounded well-being. When the
intensity of anticipatory feelings is smaller than unity, the Inada assumption
that marginal utility tends to infinity when consumption tends to zero guar-
antees that the actual demand for the risky asset will be small enough to
yield positive consumption in all states with a positive objective probability.
This implies that optimal beliefs cannot degenerate to certainty.
2For more details, see for example Tversky and Wakker (1995) and Abdellaoui (2000).
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2 The model
Our model is static, with a decision date t = 0 and a consumption date
t = 1. At date 0, the consumer selects an asset portfolio. The portfolio is
liquidated at date 1, and its value is consumed. We consider an economy with
two assets. The first asset is riskfree and yields a return that is normalized
to 0 over the period. The second asset is risky. It yields a random excess
return ex at date 1. It is assumed that the excess return of the risky asset
is bounded below by a < 0 and above by b > 0. There is an objective
cumulative probability distribution Q ∈ X[a, b] for ex. X[a, b] denotes the set
of cumulative distribution functions whose support is in [a, b]:
X[a, b] =
½
F : [a, b]→ [0, 1] | dF (x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [a, b],
Z b
a
dF (x) = 1
¾
The consumer has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u that is as-
sumed to be twice differentiable, increasing and concave. We assume that the
Inada conditions are satisfied, with limc→0+ u
0(c) = +∞ and limc→∞ u0(c) =
0. The decision problem of the agent at date t = 0 is to determine the size
α of his investment in the risky asset. Because his initial wealth is w0, he
invests the remaining w0 − α in the riskfree asset. His final wealth at date
1 is therefore equal to w0 + αex. At decision date t = 0, the beliefs of the
consumer are characterized by a subjective cumulative probability distribu-
tion P ∈ X[a, b] that may differ from the objective probability distribution
Q. Given these beliefs P , the consumer selects the portfolio (α,w0−α) that
maximizes his subjective future expected utility on consumption. We obtain
the following decision problem:
S(P ) = max
α
EP [u(w0 + αex)] = Z b
a
u(w0 + αx)dP (x). (1)
The expectation operator EP refers to the subjective probability distribution
P . S(P ) measures the felicity at date t = 0 generated by anticipatory feel-
ings. The optimal demand for the risky asset as a function of the beliefs is
denoted α(P ). It satisfies the following first-order condition:
EP [exu0(w0 + α(P )ex)] = 0. (2)
Because EP [u(w0 + αex)] is concave in α, this first-order condition is neces-
sary and sufficient for optimality. By the Inada condition, it must be true
that w0 + α(P )x > 0 for all x with a positive subjective probability dP (x).
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Because of the potential bias in the subjective beliefs, the objective ex-
pected utility of the consumer at date 1 may differ from S(P ). The objective
expected utility of a consumer with subjective beliefs P equals
O(P ) = EQ [u(w0 + α(P )ex)] = Z b
a
u(w0 + α(P )x)dQ(x). (3)
It is important to observe that the consumer’s objective expected utility
depends upon the subjective probability distribution P only through the
choice of the portfolio allocation induced by P .
We now specify the lifetime well-being of the consumer with subjective
beliefs P . At date t = 0, the consumer savors his subjective future utility,
yielding savoring felicity S(P ) at that date. At date t = 1, the agent extracts
felicity O(P ) from consuming his terminal wealth. His lifetime well-being W
is assumed to be a convex combination of his felicity at these two dates:
W (P ) = kS(P ) + (1− k)O(P ). (4)
Parameter k ∈ [0, 1] measures the intensity of anticipatory feelings in lifetime
utility. When k = 0, the consumer has no anticipatory feeling at date 0.
When k = 1, he extracts felicity just from savoring future consumption flows.
Brunnermeier and Parker (2003) consider the special case with k = 1/2.
As justified in the introduction, we assume that prior to date t = 0,
the agent controls his thoughts. He selects the beliefs P that maximizes his
lifetime well-being:
P ∗ = arg max
P∈X[a,b]
W (P ). (5)
The optimal demand for the risky asset is α∗ = α(P ∗). The main objective
of the paper is to compare P ∗ to Q, and α∗ to α(Q).
3 Some basic properties of optimal beliefs
As stated before, date-1 felicity depends upon beliefs P only through its
effect on the choice of the optimal portfolio α = α(P ) at date t = 0. In
general, there are more than one probability distribution that yield the same
optimal portfolio α. Let B(α) ⊂ X[a, b] be the set of subjective cumulative
probability distributions that yield the same optimal portfolio choice α:
B(α) = {P ∈ X[a, b] | α(P ) = α} . (6)
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It implies that O(P ) = O(P 0) for all P and P 0 in B(α).
This observation has an important consequence on the structure of op-
timal beliefs. Consider the optimal demand α∗ = α(P ∗) that is induced by
the optimal subjective beliefs P ∗. From the various subjective probability
distributions P that yield this demand α∗, the one that is selected by the con-
sumer prior to date 0 must maximize the date-0 anticipatory felicity S(P ),
since they all yield the same date-1 felicity O(P ∗). In other words, it must
be true that
P ∗ ∈ arg max
P∈B(α∗)
S(P ). (7)
Observe that this property of optimal beliefs holds independent of the char-
acteristics of the objective probability distribution Q. It allows us to derive
the following useful properties of optimal beliefs.
3.1 Optimal beliefs must be binary
Proposition 1 The optimal subjective probability distribution P ∗ has at most
two atoms: ∃(x−, x+) ∈ [a, 0] × [0, b] such that dP ∗(x) = 0 for all x ∈ [a, b]
except at x− and x+.
Proof: We can rewrite problem (7) as follows:
dP ∗ ∈ argmax
dP
Z b
a
u(w0 + α∗x)dP (x) (8)
s.t.
Z b
a
xu0(w0 + α∗x)dP (x) = 0Z b
a
dP (x) = 1
dP (x) ≥ 0 ∀x ∈ [a, b].
The first constraint states that P belongs to B(α∗), i.e., that beliefs P yield
the optimal risk exposure α∗. The other two constraints define a cumulative
probability distribution with support in [a, b]. Because the feasible set is
compact, this problem has a solution. Observe that the above program is a
linear programming problem on a compact set with two equality constraints.
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As is well known, its solution has at most two atoms.3 In order to satisfy the
first-order condition, it must be that x− and x+ alternate in sign. ¥
Thus, we conclude from this proposition that the optimal subjective be-
liefs take the form P ∗ = (x−, 1− p∗;x+,p∗) for some pair (x−, x+) and some
scalar p∗ such that a ≤ x− < 0 < x+ ≤ b and p∗ ∈ [0, 1]. Beliefs are linked
to the optimal risk exposure α∗ by the following rewriting of the first-order
condition:
p∗x+u0(w0 + α∗x+) + (1− p∗)x−u0(w0 + α∗x−) = 0 (9)
Proposition 1 is useful because it replaces the problem of finding a probability
distribution in the infinite dimensional spaceX[a, b] into a problem of finding
a triplet (x−, x+, p) that maximizes W (P ). From the technique presented
above, we can easily derive the following property of optimal beliefs: when
there are n independent assets in the economy, there must be at most n
states with a positive optimal subjective probability.
This result is quite robust. It is independent of individual preferences.
Throughout this paper, we assume that beliefs can be distorted without any
constraint, so that the only constraints to subjective probabilities are that
dP (x) ≥ 0 for all x in [a, b]. A more realistic would be to assume that
only a proportion 1− κ of the probability mass can be shifted. The logic of
the above proposition can easily be extended to this model where, for all x,
dP (x) is constrained to be larger or equal to κdQ(x) rather than to zero as in
our model. Under this constrained model, the optimal beliefs must be such
that dP ∗(x) = κdQ(x) for all x except for at most two values of x. Notice
finally that the assumption that instantaneous welfare can be measured by
an expected utility functional is essential to derive this class of results.
3.2 Only the extreme returns may have a positive sub-
jective probability
In this section, we first show that at least one of the two subjectively pos-
sible returns must be at the bounds of interval [a, b]. We define A(z) =
−u00(z)/u0(z) as the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion.
3See Gollier and Kimball (1997) and Gollier (2001, chapter 6) for a proof and other
applications of this central result.
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Proposition 2 The optimal subjective distribution P ∗ = (x−, 1−p∗;x+,p∗) ∈
X[a, b] is such that either x− = a or x+ = b.
Proof: Suppose by contradiction that x− > a and x+ < b. Consider a
marginal change in P such that a marginal increase in x+ is compensated
by a marginal reduction in x− in such a way that α∗ is unaffected. Totally
differentiating condition (9) yields
dx−
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= − p
∗u0(w0 + α∗x+)
(1− p∗)u0(w0 + α∗x−)
1− α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)
1− α∗x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
.
The subjective expected utility using optimal beliefs equals
S = p∗u(w0 + α
∗x+) + (1− p∗)u(w0 + α∗x−). (10)
Totally differentiating this equality yields
dS
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= p∗α∗u0(w0 + α∗x+) + (1− p∗)α∗u0(w0 + α∗x−)
dx−
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
,
or equivalently,
dS
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= p∗α∗2u0(w0 + α∗x+)
x+A(w0 + α∗x+)− x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
1− α∗x−A(w0 + α∗x−)
.
Because x− < 0 < x+ and A(.) > 0, this is unambiguously positive. This
change in beliefs increases the lifetime well-being of the consumer, which is
a contradiction. ¥
This result states that at least one of the two possible returns must be an
extreme return a or b. In the next proposition, we claim that the two subjec-
tively possible returns are extreme under some mild additional assumptions
on the utility function. Let R(z) = zA(z) = −zu00(z)/u0(z) be the relative
risk aversion of u at z. It is weakly increasing if R0(z) is non-negative for all
z > 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that absolute risk aversion is strictly decreasing (DARA)
and that relative risk aversion is weakly increasing (IRRA). Then, the op-
timal subjective distribution of returns has support {a, b}: ∃p∗ ∈ [0, 1] such
that P ∗ = (a, 1− p∗; b, p∗).
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Proof: Suppose by contradiction that x− > a or x+ < b. Suppose for
example that x+ is less than b. We consider a marginal increase in x+ that
is compensated by a change in p∗ in such a way that α∗ be unaffected by
the change. Totally differentiating the definition of subjective utility using
optimal beliefs, we have that
dp∗
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= −p
∗u0(w0 + α∗x+) [1− α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)]
x+u0(w0 + α∗x+)− x−u0(w0 + α∗x−)
. (11)
By definition of the subjective expected utility, we have that
dS
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
= p∗α∗u0(w0 + α∗x+) + [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)]
dp∗
dx+
¯¯¯¯
α∗
.
Using (11), dS/dx+ is positive if
K(x+, x−) = α∗x+u0(w0 + α∗x+)− α∗x−u0(w0 + α∗x−)
− [1− α∗x+A(w0 + α∗x+)] [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)]
is positive. Observe that, by risk aversion,
K(0, x−) = u(w0 + α∗x−)− α∗x−u0(w0 + α∗x−)− u(w0)
is positive for all x−. Notice also that
dK
dx+
¯¯¯¯
(x+,x−)
= α∗ [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)] [A(w0 + α∗x+) + α∗x+A0(w0 + α∗x+)]
= α∗ [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)] [R0(w0 + α∗x+)− w0A0(w0 + α∗x+)] .
We show that the right-hand side of this equality is positive. Obviously,
α∗ [u(w0 + α∗x+)− u(w0 + α∗x−)] is positive. The second bracketed term in
the right-hand side of the above equality is also positive since, by assumption,
R0 is non-negative and A0 is negative. We conclude that K is positive for
all nonnegative x+. Therefore, this change in beliefs raises the lifetime well-
being of the decision maker, a contradiction. A parallel proof can be made
when x− is larger than a. ¥
The familiar set of power utility functions u(z) = z1−γ/(1 − γ) exhibits
constant relative risk aversion and decreasing absolute risk aversion. There-
fore, it satisfies the condition of the above proposition. More generally, de-
creasing absolute risk aversion is commonly accepted by the profession as
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a reasonable assumption. Non-decreasing relative risk aversion is compati-
ble with the observation that, conditional on holding a portfolio, wealthier
consumers invest a smaller share of their wealth in stocks.4
In the remainder of the paper, we will assume that the optimal subjective
probability distribution is of the form (a, 1 − p∗; b, p∗), where p∗ denotes
the probability of the state with the highest possible return x = b. This
probability p∗ is the only remaining degree of freedom to be determined. It
depends upon the objective function Q and the utility function u.
3.3 Link with Prospect Theory
In Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU, Quiggin (1982)) and in Cumu-
lative Prospect Theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman (1992)), it is assumed
that agents maximize their expected utility by using a (subjective) probabil-
ity distribution P that is a non-linear function f of the objective function Q:
P (x) = f(Q(x)). By definition, it must be that f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 1. These
theories make the assumption that the weighting function f is intrinsic to the
preferences of the agents, exactly as is the utility function u. Together with
Brunnermeier and Parker (2003), we take a different road by assuming that
agents endogenously select the weighting function f in order to maximize
their lifetime utility. At this stage, it is thus interesting to see whether the
estimated function f of RDEU and CPT exhibits properties that are shared
by the optimal beliefs characterized in this paper.
CPT is consistent with the psychological principle of diminishing sensi-
tivity, the two endpoints of the support of the distribution of returns serving
as reference points. It has been observed that increments near these end-
points have more impact than increments in the middle of the support. The
transformation function estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) in the
gain domain, as depicted by the smooth inverse S-shaped curve in Figure 1,
satisfies this property.5 Compared to the 45◦ line corresponding to Expected
4See for example Guiso, Jappelli and Terlizzese (1996).
5Tversky and Kahneman (1992) used the following specification:
r(q) = 1− (1− q)
γ
[(1− q)γ + qγ ]1/γ
.
They estimated γ to be equal to 0.61 (as in Figure 1) . Abdellaoui (2000) obtained similar
results by using a parameter-free method to elicitate the weigthing function.
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Figure 1: Typical transformation function of the cumulative probability func-
tion Q.
12
Utility, we see that the probability transformation function in CPT transfers
much of the probability mass from the center of the support to the two ex-
treme possible returns a and b. The optimal beliefs in our model push this
kind of transformations to the limit by transferring the entire probability
mass from the interior of the support to its two endpoints. This corresponds
to the thick stepwise curve in Figure 1. Therefore, we claim that the trans-
formation of probabilities described in Prospect Theory, rather than being a
genetic characteristic of human beings, corresponds to a natural tendency of
rational agents to optimize their intertemporal welfare.
4 Selection of the degree of optimism
We now turn to the choice of the subjective probability p of the highest
possible return x = b. Using an intuitive shortcut in notation, let us define
S(p) and O(p) respectively as the subjective expected utility
S(p) = pu(w0 + α(p)b) + (1− p)u(w0 + α(p)a),
and objective expected utility
O(p) = EQ [u(w0 + α(p)ex)] ,
as functions of p, where α(p) is the unique root of the following equation:
pbu0(w0 + α(p)b) + (1− p)au0(w0 + α(p)a) = 0. (12)
We can rewrite the problem of selecting subjective beliefs as
p∗ ∈ argmax
p
W (p; k) = kS(p) + (1− k)O(p).
Before proceeding to characterize the optimal subjective probability of the
high state, it is useful to determine the effect of an increase in this probability
on the optimal demand for the risky asset. In the next lemma, we show that
an increase in the subjective probability of the high-return state raises the
demand for the risky asset.
Lemma 1 The demand for the risky asset is increasing in the subjective
probability of the high-return state: ∂α/∂p ≥ 0.
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Proof: Totally differentiating condition (12) yields
dα
dp
=
au0(w0 + αa)− bu0(w0 + αb)
pb2u00(w0 + αb) + (1− p)a2u00(w0 + αa)
. (13)
Both the numerator and the denominator are negative, which implies that
∂α/∂p is positive. ¥
This result is linked to the literature on the relationship between the
probability distribution of returns and the optimal demand for the risky
asset. Gollier (1995) provides the necessary and sufficient condition on a
change in distribution to raise the demand for the risky asset by all risk-
averse investors. The change in distribution considered in Lemma 1 is a
special case of a stochastic order named monotone probability ratio order by
Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995) and Athey (2002).
4.1 Optimism is optimal when the intensity of antici-
patory feelings is small
In general, the optimal beliefs depend upon the intensity of anticipatory
feelings k. Let p∗(k) denote the optimal subjective probability of the highest
return as a function of k. In this section, we explore the special case of small
intensities k of anticipatory feelings.
The benchmark case with no anticipatory feelings is easy to characterize.
When k vanishes, the lifetime well-being W (p; k = 0) equals the objective
expected utility O(p) = EQ [u(w0 + α(p)ex)]. Because EQ [u(w0 + αex)] is con-
cave in α, and because α is increasing in the subjective probability p of the
high state as stated in Lemma 1, O is single-peaked in p. In spite of the fact
that the agent has no anticipatory feelings, he still forms beliefs in such a way
to satisfy (12). It is obvious in this case that the agent selects the subjective
probability p∗(0) = p∗0 yielding the demand for the risky asset that is optimal
for the objective probability distribution:
p∗0bu
0(w0 + α(Q)b) + (1− p∗0)au0(w0 + α(Q)a) = 0. (14)
We now examine the impact of introducing a small degree k of anticipa-
tory feelings on the optimal subjective probability p∗(k) of the high-return
state. Because W (p; k = 0) = O(p) is single-peaked in p, a simple continu-
ity argument implies that W (p; k) is also single-peaked in p for small values
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of k.6 This implies that the first-order condition for p∗ is necessary and
sufficient when k is small. This first-order condition is written as
0 =
∂W
∂p
(p∗; k) = k
∂EPu(w0 + αex)
∂α
dα
dp
+k [u(w0 + αb)− u(w0 + αa)]
+(1− k)∂EQu(w0 + αex)
∂α
∂α
∂p
.
Because αmaximizes EP [u(w0 + αex)] , the first term in the right-hand side of
this equality is zero. Using equation (13), we can thus rewrite the first-order
condition as follows:
0 =
∂W
∂p
(p∗; k) = k [u(w0 + αb)− u(w0 + αa)] (15)
−(1− k) [bu
0(w0 + αb)− au0(w0 + αa)]EQexu0(w0 + αex)
p∗b2u00(w0 + α(p)b) + (1− p∗)a2u00(w0 + α(p)a)
. (16)
When k = 0, we verify that this condition simplifies to EQexu0(w0+αex) = 0,
which is true only if α = α(Q). This yields in turn p∗ = p∗0 as defined by
(14). Because W is locally concave in p around p∗0, the optimal subjective
probability p∗ is increasing in k around k = 0 if and only if the cross-derivative
of W is positive when evaluated at (p∗0; k = 0). It is easy to show that
∂2W
∂p∂k
(p∗0; 0) = u(w0 + α(Q)b)− u(w0 + α(Q)a).
The right-hand side of this equality has the same sign as α(Q). Thus the sign
of ∂p∗/∂k has the same sign as α(Q). Combining this result with Lemma
1 yields the next proposition. It relies on the degree of optimism which
can be measured by the difference between the subjective probability and
the objective probability of the state that is more favorable to the agent’s
wealth. When α(Q) is positive, that is, when EQex is positive, the favorable
state is the high return state, and an increase in p represents an increase in
6The analysis of the solution is more complex when the intensity of anticipatory feelings
is larger. Indeed, the objective function W = kS + (1 − k)O is usually not concave in
p. This is due to the fact that S(p) is the maximum of a sum of linear functions of p.
Therefore, S(p) is a convex function of the subjective probability p of the high return.
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optimism. When α(Q) is negative, the investor goes short on the risky asset,
and the favorable state is the low return state. The degree of optimism is
inversely related to p in that case.
Proposition 4 Introducing small anticipatory feelings in the lifetime objec-
tive function of the consumer makes him more optimistic about his portfolio
return:
α(Q)
dp∗
dk
¯¯¯¯
k=0
≥ 0.
Moreover, it raises the optimal portfolio risk:
α(Q)
dα(p∗)
dk
¯¯¯¯
k=0
≥ 0.
These inequalities are strict when the objective expected return EQex is not
zero.
The intuition of this result is simple. Suppose that the objective expected
return is positive, so that the optimal demand α(Q) for the risky asset is
positive when there is no anticipatory feeling. It is sustained by the beliefs
that the probability of the high return b is p∗0. Consider a marginal increase in
the subjective probability of that state. It marginally increases the demand
for the risky asset. But, by the envelope theorem, this marginal increase in
demand has no effect on the objective expected utility. To the contrary, it
increases the subjective expected utility. Globally, when k > 0, it raises the
lifetime well-being. This argument cannot be extended to consumers having
a larger intensity of anticipatory feelings. Indeed, in this case, a marginal
change in the subjective probability distribution would have an effect on the
objective expected utility.
In Figures 2 and 3, we provide a numerical estimation of the problem in
order to illustrate Proposition 4. We assume that the agent has a power utility
function with constant relative risk aversion γ = 3. Moreover, the worst
possible return is a = −100%, whereas the best possible return is b = +150%.
The objective probability distribution is Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1.5, 1/2), yielding
a positive expected excess return. In Figure 2, we have drawn the optimal
subjective probability of the high return as a function of the intensity k of
anticipatory feelings. In Figure 3, we depicted the relationship between k
and the optimal share of wealth invested in the risky asset. As stated in
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k
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
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p∗
Figure 2: Optimal probability of the high return state, as a function of
the intensity of anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ = 3, Q ∼
(−1, 1/2;+1.5, 1/2).
Proposition 4, we get upward sloping curves. When there is no anticipatory
feeling, the optimal share of wealth invested in the risky asset equals 5.5%.
When anticipatory feelings count as much as the objective future felicity
(k = 1/2), this optimal share goes up to 21.0%.
4.2 The effect of risk aversion on optimal optimism
We now determine the impact of risk aversion on the optimal subjective
probability distribution. In particular, we want to know whether less risk-
averse agents are more optimistic. To explore this question, suppose first
that | α | is small. It implies that we can approximate u0(w0 + αx) by
u0(w0) + αxu00(w0), which is equal to u0(w0)(1− αxA0), where A0 = A(w0).
First-order condition (12) is thus approximated as
[pb+ (1− p)a]− αA0
£
pb2 + (1− p)a2
¤ ' 0,
which implies that
α(p) ' 1
A0
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2 . (17)
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Figure 3: The demand for the risky asset, as a function of the intensity of
anticipatory feelings. Parameter values: γ = 3, Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1, 1/2).
Using second-order Taylor approximations for u(w0+αx) yields in turn that
S(p) ' u(w0) + 0.5u
0(w0)
A(w0)
[pb+ (1− p)a]2
pb2 + (1− p)a2 .
Let mi = EQexi denote the objective moment of order i of ex. Using again
second-order Taylor approximations yields
O(p) ' u(w0) + 0.5u
0(w0)
A(w0)
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2
∙
2m1 −
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2m2
¸
.
Combining these two observations implies that
W (p) ' u(w0) + 0.5u
0(w0)
A(w0)
F (p), (18)
with
F (p) =
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2
½
pb+ (1− p)a
pb2 + (1− p)a2
¡
k
£
pb2 + (1− p)a2
¤
− (1− k)m2
¢
+ 2(1− k)m1
¾
.
(19)
It is noteworthy that this approximation is exact when u is quadratic. We
thus obtain the following interesting insight.
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Proposition 5 When u is quadratic in the relevant domain of wealth, the
optimal subjective probability is independent of the consumer’s attitude to-
wards risk. It maximizes function F defined by (19), where m1 and m2 are
the objective first two moments of the excess return of the risky asset.
The first-order condition associated to the maximization of F (p) is equiv-
alent to finding the roots of a third-degree polynomial. We check that in the
special case with no anticipatory feeling (k = 0), F is concave in p with a
maximum p∗0 such that
p∗0b+ (1− p∗0)a
p∗0b2 + (1− p∗0)a2
=
m1
m2
.
This means that the subjective probability p∗0 is selected in such a way that
the objective and subjective Sharpe ratios be the same. It yields the same
optimal portfolio as the one that is optimal under rational expectations.
An important question is to determine whether the heterogeneity in risk
aversion can explain the heterogeneity of subjective beliefs in the population.
When preferences belong to the quadratic class, the optimal subjective proba-
bility distribution is independent of the degree of risk aversion of the investor.
When the utility function is not quadratic, optimal beliefs are generally not
independent of risk preferences. Brunnermeier and Parker (2003) conclude
that the heterogeneity of risk aversion in the population could explain the
heterogeneity of subjective beliefs. However, because smooth functions can
always be well approximated by a quadratic utility function in a small do-
main, we should not expect to generate a lot of heterogeneity on beliefs in an
economy with small portfolio risks at equilibrium. The assumption of small
portfolio risks is compatible with the general tone of the literature on the
equity premium puzzle. The puzzle is based on the observation that actual
portfolio risks are very small compared to the optimal risk computed on the
basis of the large objective risk premium on financial markets. We illustrate
the low sensitivity of optimal beliefs to changes in risk aversion by consider-
ing again the numerical example used above. We examine in particular the
effect of a change in the relative risk aversion γ on the optimal subjective
probability of the high state. This relationship is described in Figure 4. The
most striking aspect of this figure is the range of the vertical axis: as relative
risk aversion varies from 0.5 to 10, the optimal subjective probability of the
high state varies within the interval [0.5126, 0.5131]!
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Figure 4: The impact of risk aversion on optimal beliefs. Parameter values:
Q ∼ (−1, 1/2;+1.5, 1/2), k = 0.1.
5 Concluding remarks
We have shown that the selection of optimal beliefs in the one-riskfree-one-
risky-asset portfolio problem is governed by very precise rules. First, we have
shown that these beliefs must be degenerate at the worst and best possible
returns. This is compatible with the observation that subjects in experimental
studies tend to distort probabilities in favor of extreme events, as suggested
for example by the cumulative prospect theory. Second, when the intensity of
anticipatory feelings is small, the problem of selecting beliefs is well-behaved
(single-peaked), yielding a unique optimal subjective probability distribution.
Except in the case of a zero objective expected excess return, these optimal
beliefs always yield an increase in the optimal risk exposure when compared
to the one that is optimal under the objective probability distribution.
Moreover, investors with a larger intensity of anticipatory feelings have a
larger subjective probability of the good state together with a larger optimal
risk exposure. Because the mental process of distorting beliefs in favor of
savoring the prospect of large capital gains, the induced optimism of investors
will not be helpful to solve the equity premium puzzle, quite the contrary.
When the optimal portfolio risk is small, we also showed that optimal beliefs
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are almost insensitive to the degree of risk aversion of the investor.
This work calls for further investigation in several directions. First, it
would be interesting to examine a more general model in which more risk-
taking opportunities are available. This would be useful in order to examine
the effect of anticipatory feelings on the optimal diversification of individual
asset portfolios. Second, the current model does not take into account the
adverse effect of disappointment of the optimally optimistic investors when
they will eventually be forced to recognize the objective performance of their
asset portfolio. Third, this work suggests that delegating the selection of
the individual asset portfolios to an independent agent can be efficient.
This would neutralize the negative effect on portfolio choices of distorting
individual beliefs.
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